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I. Introduction
Surrounded by the beautiful, transparent sea and blue sky and located in the
center of the Atlantic Ocean is the small island of “Bermuda” said to be the home
of captives. This island is currently the world No.1 domicile of captive insurance
companies (hereafter “captives”). This paper attempt to explain why this small
island managed to produce such a large insurance industry, especially in captives, a
critical question for insurance professionals and jurisdictions planning to invite
captives.
This paper discusses the impact of captives on their domicile economies and
the importance of the domicile’s regulations and characteristics for the captives. In
considering the US state of Vermont, Bermuda, and the Federated States of
Micronesia as potential Japanese captive domiciles and YKK Incorporation as an
example of a captive parent, we analyze how and to what extent regulators and
characteristics attract captives by examining captives’ economic impact of captives
on their domiciles economy based on rational assumptions. The study’s results
outline what is required for Japan or a Japanese prefecture to be a successful captive
domicile.
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A captive insurance company can be defined as a subsidiary of a non-insurance
company formed primarily to insure and cover risks by financing funds of its parent
company or those of its sister companies in the same industrial group. The places
where captives are incorporated and regulated are called “captive domiciles”
(hereafter “domiciles”) where captive insurance companies are incorporated and
regulated.
Current captives include group or association captives, cell or rental captives,
incorporated cell captives, agency captives, risk retention groups among other
structured captives.
According to Strass (2011), captives were started by Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Company, a US company in Youngstown, Ohio. Frederic Mylett Reiss, who
had worked as an agent for the company, founded an insurance company to insure
risks for Youngstown Sheet and Tube with the help of his colleague underwriters in
Lloyd’s insurance market. Then, in 1962, Reiss moved to Bermuda to establish a
captive management company, International Risk Management Limited, and start
managing captives. The captive business has been flourishing in Bermuda ever
since.
II. Summary of the Related Literature and Objectives of Captive Formations
Research on captives’ relationship to local economies is scarce. Maeda (2007)
examines captives’ potential impact of captives on local economy of Nago city,
Okinawa, the Japan’s first captive domicile. A simulation indicated that one hundred
captives and related firms operating over a ten-year period would add around 210
billion yen to the local economy, 233 billion yen to the prefectural tax revenue and
2,200 new jobs. No captives have yet been established, however.
Maeda (2007) also discusses whether and to what extent captives as corporate
risk financing tools could benefit Japanese corporations and Nago City, the first
Fig. 1 Sample Structure of a Japanese Captive
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captive domicile. This paper demonstrates, first, that corporations set aside in their
captives an accumulation of funds for emergencies. A reserve fund prepared for
losses, insurance premiums, and surplus and paid-in capital would generate positive
cash flows from investments for the period between premiums are received and loss
payments are required. The longer the loss payments can be delayed, the more
investment returns the captive will earn. Thus, using a captive is an effective way to
cover casualty risks as casualty loss payments typically take a long time. The
positive cash flows that would otherwise be retained by commercial insurance
companies reduce total corporate cost of risks.
Second, captives allow corporations to profit from the difference in insurance
prices when the premiums offered by the Japanese insurance market differ from
those offered by foreign insurance markets for the same risk.
Third, having a captive creates a strong incentive to enhance loss controls. This
is particularly effective for corporations with poor loss histories and that need to
control losses to reduce the cost of their risks. Since captives eventually compensate
for the losses, the corporation will recognize that it must effectively control both
claims and losses. The negative results of losses and ineffective claims controls will
be reflected in the captive’s financial statements.
Fourth, to satisfy their insurance needs, Japanese corporations can structure
their insurance programs by tailoring their captive insurance schemes. The necessary
coverage can sometimes not be obtained from the conventional insurance market,
and captives can provide new insurance products or extend the existing coverage.
For example, Japanese corporations rarely obtain adequate coverage for such risks
as earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and for product, environmental and professional
liabilities; captives can provide alternative solutions.
Finally, Japanese corporations can take advantage of captives as alternative
financial tools for new business opportunities. For example, a corporation can
finance a new project cheaply with a fund the captive has accumulated. Borrowing
money from a captive called “loan back” is an important financial technique. A
matured captive can provide a reliable financial resource to its parent company in
emergency when Japanese commercial banks are not accessible and financing
alternatives such as equity financing and bond issues are considered too expensive.
Further research on captives includes studies on whether or not captives create
value for the parent corporations. Diallo and Kim (1989) and Adams and Hillier
(2000) use event study methods to examine whether establishing a captive insurer
creates value for a corporation’s shareholders. Event studies test the statistical
significance of a stock’s reaction to the news that a captive insurer has been formed.
Diallo and Kim (1989) find that, while the share value of the captive’s parent
remains unchanged, a non-significant negative drift of the cumulative abnormal
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return on the parent’s stock may indicate an amount that is negligible to the
stockholders but possibly significant to a handful of managers. They thus contend
that the welfare gain derived from the creation of captives most likely flows to the
managers of the parent firms rather than to the shareholders. This conclusion is
similar to that of Scordis and Porat (1998), who find that firms with captives are
more likely to have heightened manager-owner conflicts than those that do not have
captives. According to Business Insurance, however, there are well over 5,000
captives worldwide.
III. Captive Domiciles: Case Studies of Vermont, Bermuda and Micronesia
This section discusses why captives have flourished in the US and describes
the characteristics of captive domiciles in order to identify their essential features.
1. US Federal Tax Status
Our research suggests that the lack of insurance capacity, fluctuations in
insurance premiums, and high deductible plans (actually resulting from catastrophic
losses) prompted US firms to considering their own insurance companies.
Before discussing captive domiciles in detail, we will illustrate the tax
treatment of the US federal government. The US federal tax status determines the
definition of “captive insurance.” The US Revenue Rule 2002−90, states that
“insurance” shall have two elements: “risk shifting” and “risk distribution.”
According to Adkisson (2006), risk shifting occurs if a company facing the
possibility of an economic loss transfers some or all of the financial consequences
of the potential loss to an insurer, such that a loss by the insured will not affect the
insured because the loss will be offset by the insurance payment. Our interviews
with US companies and captive managers confirmed that US companies attempt to
follow the above strategy by putting their subsidiaries’ risks into captives.
Adkisson (2006) indicates that risk distribution incorporates the statistical
phenomenon known as the “law of large numbers.” Distributing risk allows an
insurer to reduce the possibility that a single costly claim will exceed the amount
obtained as a premium and set aside to pay the claim. To clarify risk shifting, we
refer to “Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th
Cir.1987).” Risk distribution entails a pooling of premiums so that a potential
insured will not in significant part in the payment of its own risks. To clarify risk
distribution, we refer to “Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d 247, 257 (6th
Cir. 1989).”
Captives’ compliance with this insurance status is important for companies,
especially when a company plans to set up its captive; captives lose their value if
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they fail to comply with the way they are defined. If they are not considered
insurance by the Internal Revenue Service, the premiums paid to them by parents
and others are not tax deductable. The deductibility of insurance premiums, or the
value created by paying the premiums as business expenses before losses occur, is
an essential reason for having a captive. Without the insurance status, the value
would be lost. According to John Prescott (2012) of Johnson Lambert LLP, the tax
code does not clearly state how many subordinated companies are needed for risk
shifting but a reasonable number of subsidiaries must be included in captive
coverage.
For risk distribution, many US companies attempt to include third party risks
such as employees’ medical expense risk, employees’ longevity (pension plan) risk,
and subordinated companies’ and suppliers’ risks into their captives.
2. Case Studies of Domiciles
(1)Vermont: The Largest Domicile in the US
Located in northeastern New England, the US state of Vermont is famous for
the beauty of its colorful fall leaves and its fabulous winter ski resorts. Its 2012
population is only about 650,000, the second lowest among the 50 states. Woods
and forest account for 76 percent of the state, which is economically dependent on
tourism and wood and paper manufacturing. It also depends, however, on the
insurance industry; it is the oldest captive domicile in the US, and not only has the
highest number of captives in the US but ranks third in the world.
The state established its first captive law, the nation’s oldest, in 1981 and then
flourished as an option for domestic American companies seeking for offshore
captive domiciles. The state currently has over active 600 captives according to Dan
Towle, Director of Financial Services for the Vermont Department of Economic
Fig. 2 Number of Captives in Each Domicile in 2011 (Source: Business Insurance, March 5, 2012)
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Development. Towle indicates that the state’s top ten employers are captive-related.
The state considers captives one of its most important industries; it uses efficient
captive registration and enjoys strong support from the state government. It employs
there 3 directors and has 32 dedicated staff members, representing the US largest
captive institution. According to him, this domicile is the largest in the world, with
assets of approximately 135 billion dollars and premium revenue of 74 billion
dollars coming from captives whose parents include 42 Fortune 100 companies and
18 Dow 30 corporations. To facilitate captive incorporations and management, the
state has various service providers, such as attorneys, captive management
companies, investment advisers, banks, accountants and actuaries. Towle (Captive
Review Magazine (2012)) reports that applications are efficiently reviewed through a
process that usually takes no more than 30 days from receipt of an application.
To attract captives to the state, the Vermont Captive Association holds an
annual captive conference in Burlington, the state capital, which usually attracts well
over 1,000 attendees. It also holds several educational seminars every year. The
state appears committed to captive education and promotion in its efforts to inform
people about the purpose of captives, their process of incorporation and their
operations. Towle states that the key elements of success include understanding the
captive industry, committing to “institutionalize” captive registrations by providing
flexibility, responding immediately to changes in industry’s demand, and having the
state governor’s strong support. Vermont reached its current stage gradually.
Vermont is a small state, and an industry like captives is vital to its economy.
Interestingly, Towle uses the words “clean money” to describe what captives are
bringing to the state: they do not destroy the beautiful environment; rather, the
industry enhances tourism by attracting many people from around the world who
come to attend conferences on captives and annual meetings. We can see from the
beautiful scenery around Burlington, why so many like to spend time relaxing in
Vermont while at work.
Most importantly, captives have created employment because they need service
providers such as managers, attorneys, accountants, actuaries, investment advisors
among others. The Captive Review Magazine’ Vermont Report (2012) states that the
captive industry has created 1,400 full-time and part-time jobs as well as direct tax
revenue, generating approximately 2 percent of the general fund budget. Captives’
premium taxes and application fees are also considerable. These figures are
significant for a small state such as Vermont.
To gain captive expertise, the state government has put significant energy into
educating the local people to become industry experts, thus raising the state’s
overall educational level.
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(2) Bermuda: The Largest Domicile in the World
Bermuda is an island consisting of over 150 coral and shore reefs in the
northwest of the Atlantic Ocean. It is said that the Spaniard “Juan de Bermudez”
discovered this island in 1503. Since 1683, it has been occupied by Great Britain.
Bermuda is a politically and economically independent member of the
commonwealth and Queen Elizabeth is its head of state. There are frequent flights
between New York and the island, about a two-hour trip. It has a one-hour time
difference with the US. Its main industries are finance and tourism. In 2010,
approximately 70,000 people lived on this island, 60% of whom were Africans and
40% English or Portuguese. As the island lacks skilled people, especially for the
finance industry, the government allows immigrations from overseas.
Bermuda’s finance industry, which is almost entirely related to the captive and
insurance industries, has attracted many immigrants and expatriates. Its average
GDP was 97,000 US dollars in 2010, one of the world’s highest. Bermuda has
become a global financial offshore center for US and UK corporations, most of
which are almost located in Hamilton. The Bermudan dollar is pegged one-to-one to
the US dollar.
Famous as a tax-haven (with zero percentage tax on corporate profits) and as
the one of the captive industry, Bermuda is also the world’s largest captive
domicile, with 862 captives in 2011, including those of many Fortune 500
corporations. In 2010, Bermuda had a gross premium volume of 19.6 billion US
dollars and assets of 12 billion dollars, asset values second only to Vermont’s.
According to Kilian Whelan, CEO of JLT captive management company based
in Bermuda, the rapid growth in Bermudan captives could be explained by the
insurance industry’s inadequate risk coverage capacity, partially caused by payouts
for catastrophic losses due to events such as 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. Huge
Table 1 Some Important Regulatory Features and Statistics for Captives in the Three Domiciles
Vermont Bermuda FSM
Number of Captives(as of 2011) 590 active 862 9
Total Assets(US $) 134.4 billion 118 billion Not disclosed
Gross Premium Written(US $) 73.8 billion 19.6 billion Not disclosed
Federal tax rate(US) or corporate tax 35.0% 0% 21%
Premium taxes 0.38% 0% 0%
Fees(annual) $500 $971 $500
Fee in Bermuda is one time fee upon registration
(Sources: CICA 2012, Captive Review Magazines (2012), Ikeuchi et al. (2012))
Demand for Captives and Domiciles ??
payments created shortages, since the world’s insurance industries are interconnected
and inter-dependent through re-insurance.
Whelan also believes that Bermuda’s success is due to its convenience as a
“one-stop shopping” domicile, where captive owners benefit by receiving all the
necessary services at this location. Bermuda has been “institutionalized” with a
captive infrastructure and service providers such as experienced captive managers,
actuaries, lawyers, accountants, banks, investment advisors, information technologies
and branches of global reinsurance companies.
Bermuda offers many benefits. Its regulations are considered fair, rational and
flexible. Incorporating captives is relatively easy and fast. Taxation is very
favorable. Bermuda’s law is derived from UK common law. The country is
politically stable. Travelling to Bermuda is relatively easy with frequent flights from
New York needing only a few hours’ flight time. Almost any kinds of captive can
be established on this island. Its beautiful natural environment and many hotels and
restaurants are nicely matched with its clean insurance industry. Their positive
experience of Bermuda over the last twenty years is important to captive owners.
Cummins (2008) offers an economic analysis of Bermuda’s captive market and
its advantages. He states that several advantages made Bermuda the world leader of
the captive market, its political stability, sound monetary system, high sovereign
debt rating, for example; he also notes its professional infrastructure and reinsurance
market. His arguments are consistent with the opinions presented by Whelan and in
our study.
(3) The Federated States of Micronesia: An Emerging Domicile
Located south of Guam and north of Papua New Guinea, the Federated States
of Micronesia (hereafter “FSM”) consists of four states and 607 scattered islands.
These main states are Pohnpei, Truk, Yap and Cosrae. Its total area is 701 square
meters, on which approximately 100,000 people live. The FSM is historically and
economically tied to Japan, with which it has a one-hour time difference. There are
frequent flights from Narita to Guam; it takes seven to eight hours to fly from
Narita to Palikir with a transfer at Guam (a direct flight from Narita is planned for
2012). The frequent flights provide convenient travel for Japanese corporations.
The country is relatively new to the captive industry: its operation started in
2008. Since the captive industry is very competitive among both onshore and
offshore domiciles, an emerging domicile such as the FSM will find very difficult to
catch up with other domiciles with a long history and more experience. The FSM’s
strategy is thus to focus on Japanese corporations for their captive domicile, since
they are closely tied to Japan’s economy and businesses. Its captive regulations and
registrations are tailored to (i.e. made “flexible” for) Japan’s business customs, tax
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system and regulations.
For example, accounting figures for assets, liabilities and equities, and tax
payments can be expressed in Japanese yen (JPY). Captives can keep JPY-based
assets in a Japanese bank, allowing Japanese captives and their parents to avoid the
risk of exchange rate fluctuations. Moreover, the FSM promises to maintain 21
percent corporate tax on captives, keeping the FSM away from “tax haven” status as
defined by the Japanese tax code1). This allows captives to pay tax locally; its profits
are thus not consolidated back to its parent in Japan. The parents of domiciles in
Bermuda and Singapore have to pay the same percentage of corporate tax as in
Japan on the profits of off-shore captives. The FSM’s twenty-one percent corporate
tax on captives indicates that their target is Japanese captives.
However, the FSM can be considered weak in their captive infrastructure
because of its newness. Captive managers and other service providers are still
located in Hawaii, Guam, Singapore, and Tokyo where the relevant services are
provided. It is not necessary to locate service providers locally, but doing so allows
the host to enjoy captives’ economic and educational benefits.
The FSM’s uniqueness is in its “Multiple Corporation Captives (MCC)”,
similar to a group or association captive. Half of the captives have been re-
domiciled from other domiciles, such as Singapore, Hawaii and Dublin, while others
are new. By September of 2012, according to its Insurance Commissioner, the FSM
has established nine captives, all of them pure or MCC established by Japanese
corporations.
Table 1 presents some important statistics and regulatory features concerning
those three domiciles, several of which are common.
IV. Case Study of a Captive: YKK Corporation
This section presents a case study on YKK Group, drawn from our interview
with its risk manager, David G. Schwartz, conducted at the Vermont Captive
Conference in August 2012.
According to the Company Profile (YKK 2012), the company was founded on
January 1934 as the San-es Sholai by Tadao Yoshida and thereafter re-named as
“YKK AP.” It has capital of 10,000 million yen, group sales of 322.9 billion yen,
and 15,500 employees all over the world in 2012. The YKK Group is a global
??????????????????????????????????????????
1 ) If a country is determined to be a “tax haven” country (i.e. if its corporate tax rate is equal to,
or below 20 %), the corporation must consolidate the net income from its subsidiary in the tax
haven country with the parent’s income in Japan. The corporation thus pays tax according to the
Japan tax code, under which a corporation cannot avoid tax by establishing a subsidiary
company in a tax haven country.
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corporation, but it has been remained privately owned. Its business is primarily in
manufacturing and the sale of residential houses and other general architectural
products. The company motto states that “YKK strives to offer employees and their
facilities competitive, comprehensive benefits that meet both their health and
financial needs and are affordable for both employees and the company.” The
company appears to care for its employees and its brand name. Because it is a
family business and small (compared to giants such as Toyota and Sony), its
strategic projects are quickly executed once a decision is made.
YKK America (headquartered in New Jersey), who initiated the captive
establishment, had to have a high deductible insurance program for the hard
insurance market (this was in the 1980s and 1990s). The fluctuations in insurance
prices and the high deductibility of loss payments are motivated the company to
consider a captive. The company had to absorb significant payouts for each loss
before the insurance kicked in and thus decided to put a payment fund into a
captive. Like other US companies, YKK created its own captive for its group. YKK
America had 2,000 employees and 400 employees in eight Latin American nations.
The company decided to form its captive in Vermont in 2008.
The captive underwrites the risks of workers compensation and property and
medical product liabilities, as well as risks of medical costs, dental costs, whole life,
retirement and long-term employee disability. To make a captive an insurance
company for tax purposes, the captive must accept the risks of the subsidiaries and
employees. According to Schwartz, the IRS tests whether at least 30 percentage of
the premiums consist of those of third parties, the standard for insurance.
Vermont was chosen as a captive domicile because of its location, travel
convenience and low fiduciary risk. According to Schwartz, Vermont has a long
experience of being a captive domicile, and its review finishes within 90 days after
the application is submitted. He feels that Vermont knows the captive business well
and that its regulations make it easier to do business there than in other domiciles
Vermont responds to the company’s needs by providing tax and legal experts,
auditors, actuaries, brokers and third-party administrators. The YKK captive has
been audited every five years. Burlington, the capital city, has frequent flights from
New York. Thus, Vermont attracts captives in many ways.
The captive now has 6 million surplus and growing. The captive has been the
object of risk control and management, being a source of profit. The purposes of the
captive are to underwrite risks of its parent and third-party unrelated businesses and
to provide a firmer control of risks. The captive began by underwriting property and
casualty risks as well as financial products such as directors’ and officers’ liabilities
and environmental risks; then, it started to cover human resources risks such as
workers compensations, employees health and accidents and other human risks. It
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was a difficult and tedious process because they had to break through the
operational walls obstructing communications among the Risk Management and
Human Resources departments and the other 18 parties involved before captive
formation could occur. Nevertheless, the process made employees aware of risk and
improved both communications and risk management within the organization.
The captive improved employee benefits, reduced the costs of risks, maintained
controls over vendor selection, provided transparency, and defined the roles of Risk
Management and Human Resources departments, among other benefits.
Unfortunately, the YKK captive does not cover risks in Japan.
This case study illustrates the most important features of a captive domicile:
institutionalization, convenience, and response to corporate needs. Vermont has
clearly earned its captive success, as has Bermuda. The FSM has been trying to
accommodate the needs of Japanese corporations by holding annual captive
seminars for them in Tokyo. Nine captives over five years is remarkable given that
about eighty Japanese captives exist around the world.
V. Monte Carlo Simulation: Simulation Methodology
This section analyzes the effect of domiciles on a hypothetical captive. We
compare between Vermont and Bermuda because they are mature and experienced.
We assume that company A has experienced product liability losses following
a Lognormal type compound Poisson process with the parameters below (see Table
2). Lognormal distribution ρ is given by the following:
ρ (B)? α
β
2πν?B
exp[?(logx?m)/2ν ]
x
1{x?0}dx, ν?0
log(X)?N(m, ν) .
Therefore, the Lévy Process {Zt}follows the Lognormal type compound
Poisson process whose Lévy measure is
ν(dx)? c 
2πν x
exp[?(logx?m)22ν ]1{x?1}dx .
We then performed a pro-forma financial analysis for five years after captive
formation and determined the end-year capital value. The objective of conducting
Table 2 Risk Model Parameters using the Lognormal type compound Poisson Process
m ν c
Model Parameters −0.0056 0.029082 0.002006
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simulations on pro-forma financial statement (i.e. the balance sheet and income
statement) is to look into the output distributions of the first, the second, the third,
the fourth and the fifth year-end capital values to determine if its captive is
sustainable. The captive is determined to be sustainable if its year-end capital values
are positive.
The simulation assumes that the initial invested capital is one million dollars.
The gross premium is 10 million dollars and its annual growth rate of the premium
is 3 percent. No dividends are paid over the five years. The investment return
follows a uniform distribution that randomly selects between 1−5 percent. The third-
Table 3 Product Liability Loss Payout Percentage for Each Year
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year
Product Liability Loss Payout % 20% 30% 25% 20% 5%
Table 4 Summary of Simulation Results
Vermont Bermuda
Probability of being negative (Bankruptcy) 3.5% 19.0%
Mean value $14,084,733 $7,801,235
Standard deviation $7,479,917 $12,170,061
Maximum Value $7,193,671 $32,722,542
The Distribution of Asset Values in the 5th Year−End after Captive Formation.
Fig. 3 A Sample Distribution of Asset Values in the First Year-End in Vermont
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party administration costs for using the management company, the actuarial services
and other services are 30,000 dollars annually. Product liability losses follow the
lognormal type compound Poisson process, as illustrated above. The loss payouts
are assumed as in Table 3. No retro reinsurance coverage is purchased. The
Vermont captive pays 1 percent of the premium income for internal administrative
and operating costs, while the Bermuda captive pays 2 percent (assumed to be
Fig. 4 A Sample Distribution of Asset Values in the 5th Year-End in Vermont
Fig. 5 A Sample Distribution of Asset Values in the 5th Year-End in Bermuda
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reasonable) in local taxes on employee’ salaries. We conducted an iteration of
10,000 using @Risk (Palisade) simulation tool pack.
VI. Results, Implications and Discussion
Table 4 and 5 and Fig. 3, 4 and 5 show the sample distributions of year-end
asset values over the five years produced by our simulations of 10,000 iterations.
We observe that, at a 96.5% confidence level, the Vermont captive’s year-end
assets would be positive with a 3.5% probability of being negative (going bankrupt)
in the 5th year-end.
On the other hand, it shows, at an 81.0% confidence level, that the Bermuda
captive’s year- end assets would be positive with a 19.0% probability of being
negative (going bankrupt). The Bermuda captive shows a higher upside potential,
with the simulation output providing a maximum value of approximately 33 billion
dollars, higher than the Vermont captive’s seven billion dollar maximum. We found
that the variation from the mean is higher in the Bermuda captive as illustrated by
its higher standard deviation. The Vermont captive is, therefore, more financially
stable one.
Table 5 illustrates the Vermont captive’s annual probability of bankruptcy and
its asset value at the 99 percent confidence level. In the first and second years, the
captive has virtually zero bankruptcy probability; this becomes positive later.
Appendix A shows the output’s simulated progress in the third and fourth years. We
found that the outputs’ variance becomes wider at each year end, a interesting
results whose reasons should be explored. For examples, we should determine the
domicile features of domicile that contribute to it.
The results provide other important findings. They imply that fee structures,
taxes, and premium taxes, among other regulatory costs, impact the captives’
financial stability significantly. This finding constitutes a unique contribution as it
demonstrates the application of a Lévy process as a hypothetical loss estimation,
through a compound Poisson process using a Lognormal Lévy measure. We have
demonstrated how modeling can be applied to determine the feasibility of a captive
through a pro-forma financial analysis.
This study has also examined in details the local characteristics of three
domiciles: Vermont, Bermuda, and the FSM. We have found that institutionalizing
captive regulations, providing convenience, and being responsiveness to corporate
needs are the important factors in domicile success. Interestingly, Vermont’s “low
fiduciary risk” pointed out as an advantage by Mr. Schwartz is identical to
Bermuda’s sound monetary system, political stability and high sovereign debt rating
(Cummins (2008)).
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Nevertheless, this study may have room for improvement that would enhance
its robustness. For example, we should investigate whether corporate tax rate on
profits has the greatest impacts on a captive. We also acknowledge that our findings
are based on certain assumptions, for example, a Lognormal type compound Poisson
process model (a Lognormal Lévy measure) is an appropriate product liability loss
model, and the uniform distribution for investment returns. We have assumed that
the future follows the pattern of past data. Furthermore, we admit that our base case
scenario has a very limited. These areas remain open for further research.
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Appendix
Sample Outputs from a Simulation at the Vermont Captive
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